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Abstract
Researchers have long recognized that the non-random sorting of individuals into
groups generates correlation between individual and group attributes that is likely to
bias naı¨ve estimates of both individual and group effects. This paper proposes a non-
parametric strategy for identifying these effects in a model that allows for both individual
and group unobservables, applying this strategy to the estimation of neighborhood effects
on labor market outcomes. The first part of this strategy is guided by a robust feature of the
equilibrium in the canonical vertical sorting model of Epple and Platt (1998), that there is a
monotonic relationship between neighborhood housing prices and neighborhood quality.
This implies that under certain conditions a non- parametric function of neighborhood
housing prices serves as a suitable control function for the neighborhood unobservable
in the labor market outcome regression. The second part of the proposed strategy uses
aggregation to develop suitable instruments for both exogenous and endogenous group
attributes. Instrumenting for each individuals observed neighborhood attributes with the
average neighborhood attributes of a set of observationally identical individuals elimi-
nates the portion of the variation in neighborhood attributes due to sorting on unobserved
individual attributes. The neighborhood effects application is based on confidential mi-
crodata from the 1990 Decennial Census for the Boston MSA. The results imply that the
direct effects of geographic proximity to jobs, neighborhood poverty rates, and average
neighborhood education are substantially larger than the conditional correlations identi-
fied using OLS, although the net effect of neighborhood quality on labor market outcomes
remains small. These findings are robust across a wide variety of specifications and ro-
bustness checks.
The authors are grateful to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York, and the Center for Real Estate and Urban Economic
Studies at the University of Connecticut for financial support. We are especially thank-
ful to Steven Durlauf for extensive comments on an earlier draft and to William Brock,
Fernando Ferreira, Albert Saiz, Holger Sieg, Todd Sinai and seminar participants at UC
Berkeley, NYU, Penn-Wharton, and Wisconsin for many helpful comments and sugges-
tions. The research in this paper was conducted while the authors were Special Sworn Sta-
tus researchers of the U.S. Census Bureau at the Boston Research Data Center (BRDC).
The research results and conclusions expressed are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the U.S. Census Bureau, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development or any other agency of the U.S. Government. This paper was screened to
insure that no confidential data are revealed.
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1 Introduction 
Economists often examine economic behavior and outcomes in empirical settings in 
which individuals have non-randomly sorted into groups. Examples include schools, residential 
neighborhoods, occupations, interpersonal relationships, correctional and treatment programs. In 
attempting to separately identify the impact of individual versus group attributes on individual 
outcomes, researchers have long recognized that this non-random sorting generates correlation 
between individual and group attributes some of which are likely to be unobserved. Because the 
associated biases are likely to be especially severe in the estimation of social interactions (peer 
effects) among individuals in the same reference group, the identification problems created by 
endogenous group formation have received extensive attention in that literature (Manski (1993), 
Moffitt (2001), Brock and Durlauf (2001)).  
 In this paper, we consider the general problem of identifying the effect of individual and 
group attributes on individual outcomes in a model that allows for both individual and group 
unobservables. When both types of unobservables are present, the identification problem created 
by non-random sorting is especially severe because, as in Epple (1987), any variable that affects 
sorting over groups will generally, by construction, be correlated with either the individual or 
group unobservable (or both).2  As a result, many common empirical strategies that are designed 
to deal with the presence of one type of unobservable often neglect the presence of the other, 
thereby either not addressing or possibly even exacerbating the corresponding biases.   
To see this, consider a specific estimation technique that is used commonly in the 
literature: the inclusion of group fixed effects in the individual outcome regression.  While it is 
often argued that this approach eliminates any biases resulting from across-group sorting, thereby 
providing unbiased estimates of the effect of observable individual attributes, this is not generally 
the case.  The problem is that non-random sorting generally induces correlation between observed 
and unobserved individual attributes within groups. In a selective hiring or matching process 
(e.g., teachers to schools, individuals to colleges, doctors to residency programs, individuals to 
occupations), for example, the total ability of individuals that sort into the same group is likely to 
be comparable leading to negative within-group correlation between observed and unobserved 
measures of individual ability, even if these measures are uncorrelated in the population. In such 
                                                 
2 As we discuss in greater detail below, the identification problem induced by the presence of two types of 
unobservables in our model bears a close resemblance to the identification problem in hedonic models 
described by Epple (1987).  In that case, Epple showed that the equilibrium matching of suppliers to 
consumers along the hedonic gradient ensured that unobservable attributes from both the demand- and 
supply-side of the problem enter the estimating equation, thereby making classic instruments derived from 
the opposite side of the market inappropriate and the identification essentially impossible with 
observational data. 
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cases, the inclusion of group fixed effects would generally lead to an attenuation bias in the 
estimated effect of observed individual attributes.3  More generally, the use of group fixed effects 
does nothing to specifically address biases that arise when sorting is driven in part by unobserved 
individual attributes. 
To address the identification problem induced by the presence of both individual and 
group unobservables in an outcome regression, we offer a non-parametric solution that is 
grounded in the canonical vertical model of sorting developed in Epple and Platt (1998) and 
Epple and Sieg (1999).4 To make the discussion of the identification problem and our proposed 
empirical methodology concrete, we consider a specific application: the estimation of effect of 
neighborhood attributes on labor market outcomes.  
We begin the paper by using the structure of the sorting equilibrium in the Epple-Platt-
Sieg (EPS) model to highlight the correlations that are induced when individuals sort across 
neighborhoods on the basis of both individual and neighborhood unobservables. We then present 
our identification strategy, which consists of two distinct parts. We begin by exploiting a robust 
implication of the sorting equilibrium in the EPS model, namely that there is a monotonic 
relationship between neighborhood housing prices and neighborhood quality.  Under conditions 
that we make explicit below, this implies that a non-parametric function of neighborhood housing 
prices serves as a suitable control function for the neighborhood unobservable in the labor market 
outcome regression.5 6  By including this control function in the labor market outcome regression, 
we eliminate the correlation between the group component of the error term and the individual 
attributes included in the regression.  This strategy implements the general observation made in 
Brock and Durlauf (2006) that a control function can be used to deal with the group unobservable 
in an individual outcome equation.7 
                                                 
3 It is not uncommon to see groups fixed effects used in estimation for environments where sorting across 
groups is expected.  For example, the inclusion of occupation fixed effects in wage regressions, school 
fixed effects in models of teacher productivity, or neighborhood fixed effects in models of housing prices.   
4 This model and its predecessors has been used or extended in theoretical settings by Epple, Filimon, and 
Romer, (1984, 1993), Epple and Romer (1991), Epple and Romano (1999), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996, 
1998) and Benabou (1993, 1996) and applied in empirical settings by Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2001), Sieg, 
Smith, Banzhaf, and Walsh (2004), Walsh (2005) among others.  See Ross and Yinger (1999) for a review 
of papers that apply this sorting model within local public finance. 
5 Note that monotonic relationship may not hold explicitly once one allows for horizontal sorting as in the 
models developed by Nechyba (1997, 1999), Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2005), Bayer and Timmins 
(2005, 2006), Ferreira (2003) and Ferryera (2003). 
6 In addition to the residential sorting context, this solution should be applicable in any setting where the 
price of entry into a group is available (e.g., wages, college tuition) or where groups can be quality rank-
ordered in some way. 
7 Ioannides and Zabel (2004) use such a control function in their work on housing demand.  It is the 
specific idea to use neighborhood housing price as a control function for unobserved neighborhood quality 
in an individual outcome equation that is new here.  Also, note that the use of price as a control function 
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The second part of our strategy is designed to address the likely correlation of unobserved 
individual attributes with observed group attributes (including the housing price control function) 
and follows a more traditional IV approach. To break this correlation, we assign each individual 
in the sample to a cell based on her observable characteristics and instrument for each 
individual’s own neighborhood attributes with the average neighborhood attributes of those 
individuals in the same cell.  Averaging neighborhood attributes over all observationally 
equivalent individuals removes any idiosyncratic portion of the sorting of individuals into 
neighborhoods associated with an individual’s unobservable attributes.  Notice also, that this 
approach amounts to using a fully non-parametric sorting model to predict each individual’s 
neighborhood attributes given her observable characteristics.  Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002, 
2005) have recommended the use of such non-linearities arising from discrete choices for 
identification in models of social interactions.8 9 
For our neighborhood effects application, we use the confidential Long Form data from 
the 1990 Decennial Census for the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area. In examining the impact 
of neighborhoods on labor market outcomes, we focus on the influence of spatial access to jobs 
and neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics on individual labor market outcomes. These 
neighborhood attributes have received a great deal of attention in the previous literature. We 
estimate models for six different labor market outcomes, a number of subsamples based on 
education, gender, and family structure, and a variety of empirical specifications designed to 
isolate the impact of each of the three parts of our proposed identification strategy.   
Our results imply that the direct impact of geographic proximity to jobs, neighborhood 
poverty rates, and college-educated neighbors is substantially larger than the conditional 
correlations identified using OLS.  These findings are robust across a wide variety of 
specifications and robustness checks. Interestingly, while geographic proximity and 
neighborhood poverty rates have the anticipated positive and negative impacts on labor market 
outcomes respectively, exposure to college-educated neighbors also has a significant negative 
effect. We discuss potential explanations for this finding below.  Thus, taken together, our results 
imply that the relationship between neighborhood attributes and labor market outcomes is quite 
complex and as a whole our results are consistent with small and even negative net effects of 
                                                                                                                                                 
has also appeared in the differentiated products demand literature in Petrin and Train (2005), although it is 
used there primarily as a computational tool in a standard instrumental variables context. 
8 Also see Bayer and Timmins (2006) and in the context of the identification of hedonic models by 
Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), Bajari and Benkhard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005).   
9 In addition to the two-part strategy outlined here, we also address additional issues related to 
neighborhood attributes endogenously determined by the sorting process (e.g., neighborhood 
socioeconomic characteristics) below.  
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improving neighborhood ‘quality’ on the labor market outcomes.  The finding of small net effects 
of neighborhood is primarily driven by the negative effect of college-educated neighbors. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a broader review 
of the neighborhood effects literature. Section 3 presents a simple version of the canonical 
vertical sorting model of Epple and Platt (1998) and Epple and Sieg (1999) and examines the 
resulting biases in ordinary least squares analyses of the effect of individual and group attributes 
on individual outcomes. Section 4 presents our three-part estimation strategy for obtaining 
consistent estimates in the presence of both individual and group unobserved attributes. Section 5 
discusses the data, sample, and specification of variables used to describe households and 
neighborhoods. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Neighborhood Effects and Labor Market Outcomes – Previous Literature 
 For the purposes of our analysis two aspects of the previous neighborhood effects 
literature are pertinent.  First, as we seek to offer a general solution to a core identification 
problem in the neighborhood effects literature, we begin by reviewing other recent approaches to 
the problem, noting their strengths and limitations.  Second, we then discuss the previous 
empirical findings in the literature that relate most directly to our application: the effect of 
neighborhood on labor market outcomes.  
 
Identifying Neighborhood Effects. The study of the identification of neighborhood effects is a 
difficult problem without a completely general solution. An important line of recent research 
seeks to identify neighborhood effects by isolating a random component of neighborhood choice 
induced by special social experiments. Popkin et al. (1993) pioneered this approach using data 
from the Gautreaux Program conducted in Chicago in the late 1970's, which gave housing 
vouchers to eligible black families in public housing as part of a court-imposed public housing 
de-segregation effort.  Similarly, Oreopolous (2003) and Jacob (2005) study the impact of re-
locations arising from administrative assignment to public housing projects in Toronto and from 
the demolition of the public housing projects in Chicago, respectively.   Most notably, Katz et. al. 
(2001) and Ludwig et al. (2001) have used the randomized housing voucher allocation associated 
with the Moving To Opportunity demonstration (MTO) to examine the impact of re-location to 
neighborhoods with much lower poverty rates on a very wide set of individual behavioral 
outcomes including health, labor market activity, crime, education, and more. Especially in the 
case of MTO, the advantages of this approach are clear – the randomization inherent in the 
program design ensures a clean comparison of treatment and proper control groups.  
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 There are, however, important limitations in the extent to which the treatment effects 
identified through re-location are informative about the nature of general forms of neighborhood 
effects per se. First, individuals studied must be eligible for a re-location program in the first 
place; this typically implies that the resulting sample is special (i.e. so as to be a resident in public 
housing) and may not be as sensitive to neighborhood effects as other individuals. Second, the 
experimental design involves re-location to new neighborhoods that are, by design, very different 
from baseline neighborhoods; this implies that the identified treatment effect measures the impact 
of re-locating to a neighborhood where individuals initially have few social contacts and where 
the individuals studied may be very different than the average resident of the new neighborhood.  
In this way, the treatment effects identified with this design are necessarily a composite of several 
factors related to significant changes in neighborhoods that are not easily disentangled (see 
Moffitt (2001) for a detailed discussion).  
 A second broad approach seeks to deal with the difficulties induced by correlation in 
unobserved attributes at the neighborhood level by aggregating to a higher level of geography. 
Evans, Oates, and Schwab (1992), Cutler and Glaeser (1997), Ross (1998), Weinberg (2000, 
2004), Ross and Zenou (2004), and Card and Rothstein (2005) identify the effect of location on 
outcomes using cross-metropolitan variation. For example, Cutler and Glaeser (1997) analyze the 
impact of segregation within a metropolitan area on a variety of outcomes including education, 
labor market activity, and teenage fertility, and Evans, Oates and Schwab use metropolitan area 
poverty rates as an instrument for neighborhood level poverty.  Again, the advantages of this 
approach are clear – aggregation certainly eliminates the problem of correlation in unobservables 
among neighbors (although potential correlation in unobservables at the metropolitan level 
becomes an issue). The effects identified through aggregation, however, include not only the 
average neighborhood effects operating in a metropolitan area but also any broader consequences 
of living in a segregated or high poverty metropolitan area.10  Thus, the strict interpretation of the 
estimated effects as neighborhood effects requires the assumption that metropolitan segregation 
does not directly affect outcomes.11  
A third approach is offered in Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2005), which uses detailed Census 
microdata to isolate block-level variation in the characteristics of neighbors within narrowly-
defined neighborhoods. The key identifying assumption underlying this design is that there is no 
                                                 
10 More residentially segregated metropolitan areas might be associated, for example, with increased racial 
taste-based discrimination in the labor market, in the application of criminal justice, etc. due to decreased 
levels of regular inter-racial contact in residential neighborhoods.  
11 It is important to point out that Cutler and Glaeser (1997) do not claim that the effects identified in their 
analysis are strictly neighborhood effects. 
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block-level correlation in unobserved attributes within block groups, due perhaps to the thinness 
of the housing market (i.e., that it is difficult to select the particular block that one would like to 
live on).  This approach identifies the effect of neighborhood by conditioning on the effect of 
location over a broader geographic range (block group).  Accordingly, the methodology is 
designed to capture very local social interactions whose influence decays very quickly with 
distance.  This approach will not capture effects that arise over broader areas, such as the 
influence of employment access or crime rates on employment outcomes.   
The Epple-Platt-Sieg style model that we will discuss below provides a useful framework 
for understanding these studies.  The model below contains two sources of error over which 
individuals sort:  an individual specific error and a neighborhood specific error.  In this context, 
traditional instrumental variables analysis often fails.  For example, an instrument for an 
individual’s neighborhood attributes must be correlated with neighborhood choice and yet 
uncorrelated with either the individual or place unobservable.  However, these three requirements 
represent a contradiction in a sorting equilibrium.  Any variable that is uncorrelated with the 
individual unobservable will only be correlated with neighborhood choice if it influences sorting 
over place unobservables, but of course this contradicts the assumption that the instrument is 
uncorrelated with the place unobservable.12  In experimental studies, residential location is 
changed based on a randomly assigned experimental treatment.  While in the studies that use 
across metropolitan variation or in the study that uses within block group variation, the implied 
assumption is that the factors that influence across metropolitan sorting or within block group 
sorting are idiosyncratic and orthogonal to the individual and neighborhood unobservables that 
influence labor market outcomes. 
All of the above studies use an empirical design intended to provide a variable that is 
correlated with an individual’s exposure to location attributes for reasons that are independent of 
the individual’s sorting behavior (experimental treatment, exogenous residence in metropolitan 
areas, or random sorting arising from a thin housing market), but these designs in turn limit the 
researchers’ ability to isolate and identify the effects of various neighborhood factors on current 
residents.  By systematically addressing the sources of sorting bias in a population of current 
neighborhood residents, we hope to provide a more detailed and complete picture of the influence 
neighborhood on resident outcomes albeit with newly imposed assumptions concerning the 
structure of the underlying sorting problem.  Specifically, unlike most of the studies above, this 
study is intended to capture the overall effect of neighborhood variables on a representative 
                                                 
12As mentioned earlier, this identification problem is comparable to Epple’s (1987) analysis of 
identification in estimating hedonic models.  
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population in their equilibrium locations.  Moreover, our approach generates a substantial amount 
of identifying information for relatively large population-based samples.  Therefore, unlike the 
studies above that rely on across-metropolitan variation or small experimental samples and so are 
only able to examine one or two variables of interest, our study is able to examine the effect of a 
larger variety of neighborhood variables on individual outcomes. 
  
The Effect of Neighborhood on Labor Market Outcomes. A wide array of studies have 
documented the relationship between various aspects of the neighborhood environment and 
employment outcomes.  The spatial mismatch hypothesis, first proposed by Kain (1968), has 
spawned innumerable studies that find that job access is positively correlated with employment 
and/or labor market earnings. Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990) and Raphael (1998), for example, 
find that youth residing far from suburban areas where low skill jobs tend to be locatedand where 
new jobs tend to be created had worse employment outcomes.  Other research has centered on the 
impact of the characteristics and behavior of neighbors on labor market outcomes.  Case and Katz 
(1991), for example, find a correlation between youth idleness and the idleness of neighbors, 
while O’Regan and Quigley (1998) find that youth are more likely to be high school dropouts and 
unemployed when they reside in high poverty neighborhoods and Weinberg, Reagan and Yankow 
(2004) find that people who move to neighborhoods with worse attributes have worse 
employment outcomes. 13  
Many scholars have suggested job market referrals or information networks as an 
important factor behind such neighborhood effects.14  Rees and Schultz (1970), Corcoran et al. 
(1980), Holzer (1988), Blau and Robbins (1990), Blau (1992), Granovetter (1995), Addison and 
Portugal (2001) and Wahba and Zenou (2003) all document the importance of referrals and other 
informal hiring channels in the labor market, using both U.S. and non-U.S. data. A number of 
these studies including Holzer (1988) and Blau and Robbins (1990) find that informal referrals 
are more productive than more formal methods in terms of job offer and acceptance probabilities. 
Additional studies including Datcher (1983), Devine and Kiefer (1991), Marmaros and Sacerdote 
                                                 
13 These papers represent a small sample of very large literatures.  For broader surveys of these literatures, 
see Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998), Ellen and Turner (1997), and Mayer (1996) 
14 The use of informal channels such as referrals by employers can be rationalized as a means to reduce the 
uncertainty regarding the quality of a prospective employee. Montgomery (1991) was the first to formally 
model a labor market in which both formal and informal hiring channels coexist. Focusing more closely on 
the information exchange among workers, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2002) analyze an explicit 
network model of job search in which agents receive random offers and decide whether to use them 
themselves or pass them on to their unemployed contacts depending on their own employment status and 
current wage.  
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(2002), and Loury (2004) find evidence that use of informal networks increases the quality of the 
match as captured by job tenure or earnings.15 16   
Further, this literature suggests that the effect of referrals varies considerably across 
different demographic groups.  In terms of intensity of usage, workers with less education and 
located in high poverty rate neighborhoods are more likely to use informal contacts (Elliot, 1999), 
men use referral networks more intensively than women (Corcoran et al., 1980), and Hispanic 
men use networks more intensively than non-Hispanic white men (Smith, 2000).  The 
productivity of networks also appear to differ across groups with high success rates observed for 
men relative to women (Bortnick and Ports, 1992) and blacks relative to whites (Bortnick and 
Ports, 1992; Korenman and Turner, 1996; Holzer (1987).  In addition, Bayer, Ross, and Topa 
(2004) find that both college educated workers and high school drop-outs benefit less than high 
school graduates from block level employment referrals.17  They also find that workers with 
children of similar age are more likely to successfully share employment referral information, and 
married women are least likely to successfully share employment referral information with each 
other. 
A relationship between labor market outcomes and neighborhood attributes may exist for 
a variety of reasons.  The most commonly discussed mechanisms in the literatures cited above 
involve information barriers to job search and the significance of informal job market referrals.  
Residential locations that are far from employment concentrations or have high concentrations of 
individuals who are not strongly attached to the labor market may provide job searchers with little 
opportunities for mentoring or for gathering information concerning potential job openings.  On 
the other hand, a high quality neighborhood may provide the individual with neighborhood 
amenities that are complementary to leisure or may expose individuals to lower risk of adverse 
events that influence labor market productivity or behavior.  For example, Kling, Liebman, Katz, 
and Sanbonmatsu (2004) find that moving to a low poverty rate neighborhood improves 
themental and physical health of housing voucher recipients inthe Moving to Opportunity Study 
(MTO).  In fact, the MTO study findings also suggest that there could be multiple mechanisms at 
work in the relationship between neighborhood and labor market outcomes.  MTO implies 
                                                 
15 See Elliot (1999) and Loury (2003) for counter examples where the use of informal networks led to lower 
wages.  Of course, the lower wages may be associated with increased match quality on desirable job 
attributes causing the individual to accept a lower wage as a compensating differential. 
16 See Ionnides and Loury (2004) for a detailed review of this literature. 
17 This finding also is consistent with assortive models of social interactions where non-college graduates 
use informal networks intensively, but college graduates are not part of that network.  See Bertrand, 
Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000), Aizer and Currie (2004), Arcidiacono and Vigdor (2004), and Weinberg 
(2005) for similar examples relating to welfare participation, prenatal care use, social interactions at elite 
universities, and social interactions among high school students, respectively. 
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substantial neighborhood effects on health for voucher recipients, but no influence on labor 
market outcomes while many studies document a positive influence of mental and physical health 
on labor market outcomes.18  The results from MTO and studies of health and the labor market 
can only be consistent if there are other influences of neighborhood poverty among MTO 
recipients that depress labor market activity. 
In order to better understand the complex relationship between neighborhood and 
outcomes, we first focus on three core variables:  employment access drawing on the spatial 
mismatch literature, percent poverty which is a standard measure of neighborhood quality, and 
percent of college graduates which was intended to proxy for the density of human capital in the 
neighborhood, but appears to capture either non-linearities in neighborhood referrals or 
unobserved neighborhood amenities that are associated with a demand for leisure.  In addition, 
we also extend the model to consider the effect of minority and immigrant population shares. 
   
3. Identifying Individual and Group Effects in the Presence of Sorting 
This paper posits a world where neighborhoods generate benefits for individuals that 
might or might not be reflected in their outcomes and individuals sort across neighborhoods 
trading off the benefits offered by each neighborhood against the price required for access to that 
neighborhood.  In such a world, attributes of both individuals and neighborhoods that affect the 
sorting process or outcomes may be unobserved to the econometrician.  Most existing research 
only explicitly considers either the individual or the location unobservables or does not make a 
clear distinction, and yet the interplay of these two unobservables is crucial in understanding the 
bias arising in any study of neighborhood effects.   
The equation that we are interested in estimating can be written as:  
 
(1) yij = β1Zi + β2X j +ω i + ξ j + εij       
 
where i indexes individuals, j indexes neighborhoods, yij is the individual outcome of interest,  Zi, 
ωi, are observed and unobserved individual attributes respectively, and Xj, ξj are observed and 
unobserved neighborhood attributes, respectively.  While we will explicitly allow for endogenous 
neighborhood attributes in our discussion of the empirical strategy in Section 4, it is 
expositionally simpler to consider only exogenous attributes here.  Specifically, we assume that 
                                                 
18 For some recent examples, See Smith (2003, 1999), Case, Lubotsky, Paxson (2002), Ettner, 
Frank, Kessler (1997). 
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the covariances between observed and unobserved attributes are equal to zero in the distributions 
of individuals and neighborhoods:19 
 
 (2)  
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Even when only exogenous attributes are considered in (1), non-random sorting will generally 
imply correlation between all individual and neighborhood attributes, thereby creating correlation 
between any observed attributes and the composite error term in (1).  To see why non-random 
sorting gives rise to such correlations, it is helpful to write down a simple version of the Epple-
Platt-Sieg model. 
 
A Simple EPS Model of Residential Sorting.  Consider a closed metropolitan area consisting of 
J neighborhoods with a finite number of houses available in each neighborhood.  Exogenous 
neighborhood attributes Xj and ξj are distributed such that (2.i) holds. A population of individuals 
of total size equal to the total number of house available in the metropolitan area individuals has 
individual characteristics Zi and ωi distributed such that (2.ii) holds.  Let individuals sort across 
neighborhoods trading off between the outcome of interest yij and the price of entering 
neighborhood j, pj.  Specifically, write individual utility V from choosing neighborhood j as: 
 
(3)  Vij = f yij , p j ,ei,µi( ) 
 
where ei indicates an individual’s initial financial endowment and µi represents an individuals 
tastes for the outcome influenced by neighborhood choice, y, versus all other forms consumption, 
the price of which is assumed to be independent of the individual’s neighborhood choice.  Given 
the structure of equation (1), it will be helpful to characterize the neighborhood contribution to 
the individual outcome y as: 
 
(4) θ j = β2X j + ξ j  
 
                                                 
19 These assumptions of strict exogeneity are standard in any simple regression estimate of the relationship 
between an observed outcomes and control variables. While not uncontroversial, these assumptions seem 
reasonable in an analysis intended to examine bias due to sorting. 
 11 
It is this neighborhood quality index θj for which individuals will implicitly be willing to pay 
higher price of entry pj to enter a given neighborhood j.20  
 
Structure of Equilibrium. Decisions in an EPS-style model are driven by the trade-off between 
consuming more of the neighborhood (influenced) good y and the price of entry into the 
neighborhood p.  As p increases the individual has less money available for the consumption of 
all other (non-neighborhood) goods.  In equilibrium, the price of entry into each neighborhood 
adjusts so as to ration the quality of the neighborhood good θj available there. 
To derive predictions about the structure of the equilibrium, it is helpful to make the 
following single-crossing properties on preferences: 
 
(5) ;0;0
22
<<
µddy
pd
dedy
pd
 
 
The first of these single-crossing properties implies that as an individual’s financial endowment 
increases, the slope of the indifference curve between the price of entry into the neighborhood p 
and the consumption of the neighborhood good y decreases, ceteris paribus.  The second 
condition implies that the same holds when an individual’s preferences for the neighborhood 
good increases. 
Given these single-crossing assumptions, Epple-Platt (1998) demonstrates that a sorting 
equilibrium exists and can be characterized by two properties that are relevant for our analysis.  
The first property is actually a pair of stratification conditions: that (i) conditional on tastes, 
individuals are perfectly stratified across neighborhoods on the basis of their initial financial 
endowment e and (ii) conditional on initial financial endowment, individuals are perfectly 
stratified across neighborhoods on the basis of tastes, µ.  These stratification properties can be 
seen in the following graphical depiction of an EPS equilibrium:  
 
 
 
                                                 
20 In Section 4 below, we consider generalizations of this simple EPS model to cases where individuals 
value more about neighborhoods than the direct effect of neighborhood on our outcome of interest. 
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Figure 1 depicts how individuals sort themselves across neighborhoods with increasing values of 
the neighborhood good θJ >θJ-1 > ... >θ2 >θ1.  The vertical axis indicates an individual’s value of 
the initial financial endowment e, while the horizontal axis depicts an individual’s taste for the 
outcome influenced by neighborhood choice, y.  The diagonal lines in the figure characterize the 
boundary in e-µ space that divide the set of individuals that choose one neighborhood versus the 
other (these boundaries need not be parallel or even straight lines).  Finally, for expositional 
purposes, the graph is drawn assuming a finite support for both tastes and endowments although 
this is not required. 
The stratification result in income can be seen in Figure 1 by considering households with 
a given value of the taste parameter µ and moving vertically across neighborhoods.   In this case, 
any individual A with endowment greater than individual B (eA > eB) chooses a neighborhood 
with at least as great a value of θ.   Likewise, the stratification result in tastes can be seen by 
conditioning on income and moving horizontally across neighborhoods. In this case, any 
individual A with tastes greater than individual B (µA > µB) chooses a neighborhood with at least 
as great a value of θ.  Notice more generally, that not only are endowments and tastes positively 
correlated across neighborhoods, but they are negatively correlated within neighborhoods.  That 
is, conditioning on a particular neighborhood the individuals with the highest endowments 
systematically have the lowest expected level of tastes and vice versa. 
 Returning to our main estimating equation (1), the key insights that the EPS model 
provides regarding the resulting correlation between observed and unobserved attributes on the 
right hand side can be seen if we assume that individual tastes µ are positively correlated with 
Figure 1: Stratification of Individuals Across Neighborhoods in EPS Equilibrium 
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both observed and unobserved productive individual attributes: Zi, ωi.  Specifically, assuming 
that: 
 
  (6) [ ] [ ] 0'0' 1 >> iiii ZEandE µβωµ  
 
In this case, the structure of the EPS equilibrium implies two key conditions:  
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Condition (7.i) implies that productive observable individual attributes are positively correlated 
with unobserved neighborhood attributes.  Imagine, for example, that an individual’s educational 
attainment both positively affected her taste for the neighborhood good and had a positive direct 
influence on y.  In this case, we would expect a positive correlation between individual 
educational attainment and any unobserved aspects of a neighborhood that contributed to the 
production of y. Condition (7.ii) implies that the reverse also holds: that observable neighborhood 
attributes are correlated with unobserved individual attributes.  Returning to our educational 
attainment example, imagine if educational attainment were unobserved.  In this case, we would 
expect a positive correlation between this unobserved individual attribute and any observed 
attributes of a neighborhood that contribute to the production of y.   
Another property that follows directly from the EPS model is: 
 
(8) [ ] [ ] 0|'0|' <⇒< jeEjeE iiii ωµ   
 
that conditional on neighborhood, endowments and tastes are negatively correlated.  From this 
correlation, it is easy to understand why including neighborhood fixed effects when estimating 
equation (1) does not provide unbiased estimates of either observed individual attributes of the 
effect of neighborhood.  That is, when the analysis is restricted to within-neighborhood 
comparisons of outcomes, those individuals within a neighborhood observed with the highest 
values of observed endowments systematically have lower tastes for the neighborhood good.  So, 
again, to the extent that individual tastes are positively correlated with individual productivity, 
correlation between the observed and unobserved components of equation (1) would remain. 
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Broad Estimation Strategy. Our estimation strategy consists of two main parts designed to 
break the complex correlation patterns between the observed and unobserved components of 
equation (1).  As the correlations in (7) and (8) make clear, the sorting bias arising from the 
presence of both individual and neighborhood unobservables in equation (1) is substantially more 
complex that simple selection problems.  For example, if an individual with apparently high tastes 
for neighborhood quality based on their observables resides in a apparently low quality 
neighborhood based on location observables, the underlying reason for this sorting outcome is 
unclear – either the neighborhood has unusually high unobservables or the person has 
unobservables associated with a very low preferences for neighborhood quality.   
 The key insight that we draw from the EPS sorting model in this paper is that this 
apparent ambiguity can be resolved by using information on neighborhood prices.  If the 
neighborhood in question has a very high price, the natural conclusion is that neighborhood 
unobservables are very good, but if the price is low the individual taste unobservables must be 
negative.  In this way, we will use a flexible function of housing prices as a proxy for the 
unobserved portion of neighborhood quality in (1), which reduces the problem to a more 
traditional problem arising from selection into neighborhoods based on individual unobservables.  
We then address this more traditional selection problem using standard instrumental variable 
techniques to break the correlation between neighborhood attributes and individual 
unobservables.21  
  
Estimation Strategy - Part I. To illustrate this two-part solution, we begin by considering the 
problem described in condition (7.i) above: the correlation of observable individual attributes 
with unobserved neighborhood attributes.  In this case, it turns out that a second property of the 
EPS equilibrium suggests a natural fix.  In particular, EPS prove that neighborhoods with 
increasing values of θJ > θJ-1 > ... >θ2 >θ1 are also ordered monotonically in terms of 
neighborhood housing prices: pJ >pJ-1 > ... >p2 >p1.   
This monotonicity condition implies that there exists a function f such that θ =f(p).  Thus, 
a non-parametric function of neighborhood housing prices can serve as a perfect control function 
for θ in equation (1):  
 
                                                 
21 This solution requires that the supply elasticity of group openings be constant across groups.  In the 
neighborhood effects model, the supply elasticity of housing must be constant across neighborhoods, which 
suggests that price might not be a suitable control function for an analysis including exurban and rural areas 
with high elasticities of supply.  In our application,  we focus on the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
which is heavily developed with little opportunity for the construction of new housing. 
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(9) ijijiij pfZy εωβ +++= )(1       
 
Given a consistent estimate of f(p), β2 can then be recovered from a simple regression of f(p) on 
X: 
 
(10) ˆ f p j( )= β2X j + ξ j  
 
A difficulty remains, however, if equation (9) were estimated via OLS: namely the correlation of 
f(pj) with ωi. The remaining correlation between the observed and unobserved portion of equation 
(9) is due directly to the stratification result in the EPS model: simply put, individuals with high 
tastes for the outcome of interest choose higher quality neighborhoods and, as a result, to the 
extent that these tastes are correlated with the direct effect of individual attributes bias the 
estimation of equation (9).  But this problem is a standard selection problem that can be addressed 
by finding an instrument that is correlated with the price of an individual’s neighborhood but not 
with the individual’s unobserved attribute.  In the next section, we describe our proposed solution 
to this problem.  The key insight to take away from the analysis of the sorting equilibrium is that 
prices can serve as a control function for the neighborhood component of the unobservable in the 
outcome equation (1), thereby reducing the identification to the more manageable one of dealing 
with a single unobservable. 
 
4. Estimation Details 
As just described, our broad estimation strategy is divided into two main parts: (i) 
including a control function based on housing prices in the main estimating equation and (ii) 
instrumenting for this control functionand other exogenous neighborhood attributes with variables 
that are correlated with the control function but not the individual unobserved attribute ω.  In this 
section we provide the details of the implementation of these two main parts of the strategy. We 
then extend the analysis to allow for endogenous neighborhood attributes such as the 
socioeconomic characteristics of one’s neighbors.  Finally, we conclude this section by 
considering generalizations of the simple EPS sorting model presented above, discussing the 
extent to which the estimation strategy can be extended in those circumstances. 
 
Implementing the Control Function. In practice, we make one key modification when including 
a control function in equation (9).  Specifically, instead of generating a control function for the 
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full neighborhood quality index θ, we instead focus on developing a control function for just the 
unobservable, leaving β2Xj in the main estimating equation.  Specifically, we estimate a control 
function for ξj as the average residual for each neighborhood arising from a simple housing price 
equation estimated for the entire metropolitan area. The housing price (pij) can be described by  
 
(11) ijjjijij uXWp +++= λδδ 21        
 
where Wijm is a vector of housing unit attributes.  Controlling for housing characteristics absorbs 
out any aspect of prices that are explained by housing attributes.  We do this because we think 
housing attributes are a dimension of prices that are unlikely to contribute directly to labor market 
outcomes.  We then estimate: 
 
(12) ijijjiij XZy εωλβββ ++++= ˆ421  
 
where we must deal directly with the correlation of Xj and jλˆ with ωi. 
 
 
Instrumenting for Neighborhood Attributes.  To address this correlation we want to instrument 
for Xj and λj with a portion of observed neighborhood unobserved attribute that is uncorrelated 
with an individual’s own unobserved attribute. We propose to use a function of the average 
values of observed neighborhood prices for families with the same observable characteristics Zi as 
instruments: ]|ˆ,[ ZXE j λ .  The logic behind these instruments is that (i) the instruments should 
be predictive of location because similar individuals should make very similar location choices if 
they face the same opportunity set (metropolitan housing market), and (ii) the instruments should 
not be correlated with the individual’s unobservable because they are based entirely on individual 
observables that have already been included directly in the labor market equation.22 
 Most individual and family attributes, such as parent’s education, or family size, are 
discrete in nature.  For the purpose of developing these instruments, we organize individuals into 
homogenous cells based on all possible permutations of the discrete observable attributes that 
explain an individual’s outcomes in the labor market.  Specifically, the mean neighborhood 
                                                 
22 In principle, one might imagine that individuals in the same cell are similar on unobserved features, such 
as ability or tastes, so that the cell members location choices are driven by unobservables that are similar to 
the unobservables that drive the individual’s location choice.  This possibility is ruled out,  however, by the 
assumption in equation (2) that individual observables are uncorrelated with individual unobservables. 
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exposure within an individual’s cell is used to instrument for the individual’s actual exposure to 
various neighborhood attributes.  The reader should note that an individual’s actual location 
attributes are always excluded from the calculation of the cell exposure rates applied to a specific 
individual. 
A couple of additional features about this instrument are worth noting.  First, notice that 
]|ˆ,[ ZXE j λ  are essentially nonparametric predictions of theobserved and unobserved quality of 
neighborhood that an individual with a particular set of characteristics Z would choose.  In this 
way, our IV approach amounts to using a fully non-parametric sorting model to predict each 
individual’s neighborhood attributes given her observable characteristics.  This empirical strategy 
exploits the non-linearities inherent in the sorting process.  That such non-linearities could serve 
as the basis for identification of individual outcome equations in the presence of sorting has been 
key insight of the work by Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002, 2005) and has been exploited in 
closely related work by Bayer and Timmins (2006).  Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), 
Bajari and Benkhard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005)  use similar sources of identification in 
the  estimation of hedonic models. 
Second, notice that in a single metropolitan housing market this expectation relies on 
non-linearities.  If Z were allowed to enter (1) completely flexibly, the instrument would contain 
no independent variation.  In the application that follows, which is based on data from a single 
large metropolitan area, the independent variation in our instrument derives from the fact that we 
simultaneously use multiple household characteristics to define the cells upon which are 
instruments our based.  At the same time, we include each type of characteristic (e.g., education, 
household structure) only directly in the outcome equation (1).  The effect of neighborhood 
would be unidentified if the outcome model included a fixed effect for each of cell of 
observationally equivalent individuals. It is important to point, however, that the method that we 
propose here could easily be extended to multiple metropolitan areas.  In that case, even if fixed 
effects were included directly in (1) for each household category upon which the instrument was 
based, the instrument would have independent variation due to variation in average location 
decisions made by identical household types in different metropolitan markets.23   
 
Allowing for Endogenous Neighborhood Attributes. A final endogeneity issue arises in our 
application because some of the neighborhood attributes that we would like to consider are 
endogenously determined by the sorting process itself.  Specifically, in our baseline 
                                                 
23 For an example, see Ross and Zenou (2005). 
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specifications, we include measures of the average educational attainment and percent of 
households in poverty within the neighborhood in equation (1).  Re-writing equation (11) and 
(12) here to explicitly include neighborhood averages of certain individual attributes Z j  gives: 
 
(13) pij =δ1Wij +δ2X j +δ3Z j + λ j + uij       
 
(14) ijijjjiij ZXZy εωλββββ +++++= ˆ4321  
 
Since the sorting process generates a correlation between Zi and ξj it follows immediately that 
Z j and ξj will be correlated in an analogous way in equation (13).  To estimate equation (13) 
therefore, we develop instruments for neighborhood demographic variables using the composition 
of neighborhoods with similar fixed or exogenous attributes, such as the employment access of 
the location or the physical quality of the housing stock in the neighborhood.  Since neighborhood 
attributes tend to be continuous variables, a distance measure is developed to characterize the 
degree of similarity between neighborhoods.  The instruments for each jmZ  are a weighted 
average of the kmZ ’s for neighborhoods that are similar to neighborhood j with the weight based 
on the degree of similarity or proximity (inverse of the distance in attribute space). Specifically, 
 
(15) )),(( kjkkj XXWZMeanZ jm−Π∈=
)
        
 
where W represents a weighting function based on a non-parametric kernel smoother, such as the 
tri-cubic kernel where 33 ))/),((1(),( Maxkjkj DXXDXXW −= , D is a distance function, 
and Dmax is the maximum distance over which neighborhoods will be considered, see McMillen 
(1996).  The instrument is exogenous to jZ  given the exogeneity of Xj.
24 25   
                                                 
24 The cubic spline requires the specification of a maximum distance at which all locations beyond that 
distance have zero weight.  This distance was chosen for each block group so that ten percent of  all block 
groups are used to calculate the average for a given block group.  Results are very similar using twenty or 
five percent of all block groups.  Naturally, the block group itself is not included in this weighted average. 
25 Again, as in the use of aggregation to form instruments for the earlier part of our estimation strategy, the 
use of aggregation in a single metropolitan housing market again implies here that the independent 
variation in our instrument derives from nonlinearities.  It is again important to point, however, that the 
method that we propose here could easily be extended to multiple metropolitan areas, where again 
independent variation in the instrument would arise naturally due to across market variation.  See the 
Identification sub-section below for more discussion of this point. 
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 Having estimated equation (13), we then estimate equation (14) using the same strategy 
outlined in the previous sub-section, forming instruments based on average neighborhood 
attributes for households in the same cell for both exogenous and endogenous neighborhood 
attributes. 
 
Generalizing Our Simple EPS Sorting Model. A key assumption underlying the simple EPS 
sorting model that we outlined in Section 3 is that individuals care about their neighborhood 
choice through only two channels: the neighborhood (influenced) good y and the price of entry 
into the neighborhood p.  It is for this reason that a flexible function of neighborhood housing 
prices makes a perfect control function for θ, the neighborhood contribution to the production of 
y. To the extent that households instead value multiple dimensions of neighborhood quality, a 
flexible function of neighborhood housing prices will no longer serve as a perfect control function 
for θ. 
 So, how severe of a problem is this for our proposed methodology?  The first thing to 
note is that if other dimensions of neighborhood quality that affect household consumption are 
observable, they can be first conditioned out of neighborhood housing prices in a first stage 
hedonic price regression.26  This is the reason, for example, that we condition on housing 
attributes in estimating equation (11) and separately estimate the effect of observed neighborhood 
attributes on labor market outcomes.  If, on the other hand, households value another dimension 
of neighborhood quality that is unobserved, the control function approach that we propose will no 
longer work perfectly.  In that case, our proposed method will work only as well as housing 
prices are indeed correlated with that aspect of neighborhood quality that affects the outcomes of 
interest.  In general, we hope that we are able to condition on enough of what might affect 
housing prices other than neighborhood quality (e.g., housing attributes) directly in the estimation 
of the first-stage hedonic price regression. 
 
Robustness and Identification.  It is important that the reader be aware of the strengths and 
limitations of this identification strategy.  The instruments used for neighborhood contribution in 
both the labor market outcome and housing price/rent models make intuitive sense.  In the 
individual sample, the exposure of observationally equivalent individuals are used to instrument 
for the individual’s exposure to specific neighborhood attributes, and similarly the demographic 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
26 If these other neighborhood attributes are exogenous, this first stage regression can be estimated via OLS.  
If they are endogenous, instruments would need to be used in the first-stage regression analogous to those 
discussed in the previous sub-section of the paper.  
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composition of neighborhoods with observationally similar environmental variables, primarily 
housing stock composition, is used to instrument for a neighborhood’s demographic composition 
in the sample of housing units.  Since these instruments are based on observable characteristics of 
individuals and neighborhoods, they should be orthogonal to individual and neighborhood 
unobservables, respectively.   
 As discussed earlier, the instruments exploit the highly non-linear relationship that is 
likely to arise between observable attributes and sorting outcomes.  The models are identified 
because some non-linear terms are excluded from the second stage labor market and housing 
price regressions.  We attempt to address concerns with this identification strategy in a number of 
ways.  First, the labor market models are expanded to include important non-linearities, i.e. the 
interaction of gender with family structure.  Further, we rerun the analyses dropping individuals 
with high levels of human capital with the expectation that these individuals benefit less from 
neighborhood level information on the labor market.  Both of these changes substantially modify 
the source of identification, and we would expect the results to be unstable and move in 
unexpected directions in response to these changes.  Similarly, we conduct additional analyses 
that control for the actual neighborhood housing stock composition in the housing price and labor 
market equations.  As above, we would expect spurious estimates to be quite sensitive to 
including such variables, which are likely to soak up a substantially amount of information 
associated with neighborhood unobservables.   
We also posit that the influence of neighborhood on household capital income is likely to 
be much smaller than the neighborhood effect on labor market outcomes.  We regress outcomes 
concerning capital income on the same set of individual and neighborhood variables using both 
ordinary least squares and our instrumental variables specification.  If our identification strategy 
is valid, we would expect that neighborhood variables exhibit a high correlation with capital 
income using OLS models due to sorting, but much smaller effects using our IV specification. 
Finally, the reader should be aware of the implications of the key exogeneity assumptions 
made in equation (3). The exogeneity assumption for individual variables Zi is fairly straight 
forward and well understood in the literature.  The impact of an individual variable like education 
level is likely to capture the influence of both education and any individual unobserved attributes, 
such as motivation, that are correlated with education. The exogeneity assumption for 
neighborhood variables is similar for a variable that is considered fixed Xj. For example, good job 
access may be correlated with some negative aspects of neighborhood quality, and therefore 
capture both positive effect of job access and the ambiguous effect of the portion of unobserved 
neighborhood quality that is correlated with job access in the population of neighborhoods.   
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5. Sample, Control Variables, and Geography 
 The sample of prime age adults (age 25 to 59) are drawn from confidential Long Form 
files of the 1990 Decennial Census for the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  The 
sample drops a small number of non-Hispanic individuals whose race is not defined as white, 
African-American, or Asian and Pacific Islander, as well as households residing in census tracts 
where employment access is not defined resulting in a sample of approximately 178,000 
individuals.27  
The bulk of the analysis considers three variables to describe labor market outcomes:  
labor force participation last week, average number of weeks worked last year conditional on 
working any weeks, and average hours worked per week last year conditional on having worked 
at least 40 weeks per year.  Three additional labor market variables are also considered that are 
likely to be behaviorally related to the preceding variables:  whether the individual worked any 
weeks last year, employment last week conditional on being a participant in the labor market, and 
hours worked last week if employed, see Table 1.  It also should be noted that the exact sample 
for individual outcome variables varies because individuals are dropped from the analysis sample 
when an outcome is imputed. 
For the purpose of describing employment outcomes as well as identifying 
observationally equivalent individuals, adults in the sample are described by series of categorical 
control variables (Z) capturing the individual’s education (4), age (3), race and ethnicity (4), 
household structure (6), gender (2), and immigration status (3) where the numbers in parentheses 
represent the number of categories.  The labor market models also contain key interactions of 
gender with marital status and presence of children to address well-known aspects of female labor 
force participation in the United States.  These variables are also used to create categories based 
on all permutations of the categorical variables giving rise to 1,718 cells. All prime age adults that 
belong to the same cell (Ω ) as the individual (excepting the individual and their family members 
of course) are used to calculate average neighborhood attributes.  The sample contains households 
falling into 1,632 cells, and after dropping cells with less than 10 households to reduce 
measurement error the final sample contains households in 996 cells.  This restriction reduces the 
sample by less than 3,000 individuals and has no effect on any of the empirical results presented 
in the paper.   
                                                 
27 The sample contained approximately 700 non-Hispanic individuals who did not fit into one of these 
racial categories.  About 250 individuals resided in block groups where employment access is not defined.  
See Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2004) for more details on the confidential census data.   
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 Each household and its members reside in a housing unit, and the location of that unit is 
geo-coded to one of approximately 2,600 census block group in the Boston Metropolitan Area. 
The neighborhood is described by the following block group characteristics:  percent of 
households in poverty, percent of individuals who are college graduates, percent individuals who 
are disadvantage minorities (African-American or Hispanic), and percent of individuals who were 
not born in the U.S.; as well as a job access measure calculated at the census tract level.  The job 
access measure is based on an average of jobs in the same age and education category as the 
individual where the average is weighted based on the average commute time between the 
individual’s residence and potential employment locations.  The weights are based on the 
coefficient estimates arising from a gravity model, see O’Reagan and Quigley (1998).28 
A proxy for unobserved neighborhood attributes is calculated as the block group mean 
residual from a housing price hedonic regression.  These residuals are obtained by regressing the 
logarithm of house price and/or rent (depending upon whether owner-occupied or not) on the 
physical attributes of each unit: number of bedrooms, number of rooms, age of the unit, whether 
the unit is single family, whether a multi-family with 10 to 19 units, and whether multi-family 
with 20 or more units, as well as the neighborhood composition variables described above.29 As 
discussed earlier, the neighborhood composition arises from a household sorting process and is 
endogenous to location unobservables.  Therefore, the housing price/rent equation is estimated 
using instrumental variables, and the instruments are constructed as weighted averages of the 
demographic composition of similar neighborhoods based on the following neighborhood 
housing stock variables:  percent owner-occupied units, percent single family units, percent large 
multi-family units (greater than 20 units), percent 1 bedroom or studio units, percent 4 plus 
bedroom units, average age of housing stock, presence of group quarters, as well as employment 
access are used as instruments. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 The gravity model is estimated by regressing the logarithm of the number of workers commuting 
between two locations on the logarithms of the workers at the origination, of the jobs at the destination, and 
of the commute time between those locations.  Typically, location combinations are dropped when no flows 
are observed between two locations, which can lead to a noisy measure of employment access at the census 
tract level.  In order to mitigate this noise, we use the logarithm of one plus the flows and impute commute 
times using a non-parametric kernal smoother based on the cubic spline. 
29 The model allows hedonic attributes to vary by owner-occupancy, and the logarithmic transformation 
allows the difference between monthly flows (rent) and value (house value) to be captured by the owner-
occupancy dummy.  A common dummy variable is estimated for each neighborhood using all housing units 
in that neighborhood whether rental or owner-occupied. 
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6. Empirical Results 
Baseline Models 
 Prior to discussing and interpreting the empirical results, it is important to acknowledge 
that a relationship between labor market outcomes and neighborhood attributes may exist for a 
variety of reasons.  The most commonly discussed mechanism involves information barriers to 
job search and the significance of informal job market referrals.  Residential locations that are far 
from employment concentrations or have high concentrations of individuals who are not strongly 
attached to the labor market may provide job searchers with little opportunities for mentoring or 
for gathering information concerning potential job openings.  In policy discussions, the usual 
presumption is that these factors are much more important for youth and low skill workers.  On 
the other hand, a high quality neighborhood may provide the individual with neighborhood 
amenities that are complementary to leisure or may expose individuals to lower risk of adverse 
events that influence labor market productivity or behavior.  For example, Kling, Liebman, Katz, 
and Sanbonmatsu (2004) find that public housing residents who were randomly selected to 
receive vouchers to move to low poverty rate neighborhoods had improved health outcomes.  
These last two factors may affect all workers equally or may even have a larger effect on high 
human capital workers with substantial experience or education. 
 Table 2 presents the results for the OLS and IV estimations of the relationship between 
individual and neighborhood attributes and being in the labor market, weeks worked last year if 
working last year, and average hours worked per week if worked at least 40 weeks last year, 
respectively.30  The specifications presented control for individual attributes plus employment 
access, poverty rate, and percent of residents who graduated with a college degree from a four-
year institution.  The IV specification also includes a control for neighborhood unobservables 
based on housing prices and rents in each block group. 
Focusing on the estimates for neighborhood variables, the estimated impact of 
neighborhood attributes are substantially larger than the OLS estimates.  Specifically, the positive 
impact of employment access increases dramatically for all three employment outcomes so that a 
one standard deviation in employment access implies a two percent increase in the likelihood of 
labor force participation, a one and a third of a week increase in number of weeks worked in a 
year, and a two and a half hour increase in hours worked per week.  The negative impact of a one 
standard deviation increase in the poverty rate is a seven percent lower labor force participation 
                                                 
30 The estimates for individual attributes also appear reasonable.  Focusing on labor force participation, 
males have higher participation rates, participation falls between 45 and 59, participation rises with 
education, increases for married males especially with kids, and decreases for married females especially 
with young children. 
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rate and one week less work during the year with the impact on hours being positive and 
statistically insignificant. The neighborhood unobservables are also associated with more labor 
force participation, weeks, and hours. 
The percent college educated is negatively associated with all three outcomes. This 
finding is consistent with previous findings that labor market referrals are used less intensively by 
individuals with higher levels of education (Ionnides and Loury, 2004) and that college educated 
individuals may both benefit less from and contribute less to informal job networks (Bayer, Ross, 
and Topa, 2004).  Alternatively, percent college educated may capture local amenities that are 
complementary to leisure and non-market home production activities.  For example, individuals 
residing in locations with neighbors who have a higher level of education may simply enjoy 
working less and spending more time at home.  As discussed, this explanation might help explain 
why Moving to Opportunity finds a positive impact of neighborhood on health, but no impact of 
neighborhood on labor market outcomes.  Presumably, the lower poverty rates lead to superior 
health outcomes and an associated increase in labor market potential, but the exposure to more 
college educated individuals decreases labor market outcomes. 
The finding that OLS estimates of neighborhood effects are biased downwards is 
consistent with the hypothesis that individuals with poor unobservables in terms of labor market 
outcomes compensate for these unobservables by sorting into locations with better employment 
prospects.  In the neighborhood effects literature, researchers have often expected to find positive 
selection where high quality workers reside in high quality locations.  While this view makes 
considerable sense when considering the demand for neighborhood amenities related to quality of 
life, it is less clear that positive selection will arise on variables that impact labor market 
participation, such as employment access or the quality of informal job networks.  High skill 
workers with strong attachment to the labor market may be less willing than workers with weak 
labor market attachment to give up neighborhood quality of life amenities in exchange for access 
to urban environments with good labor market information and low job search costs. 
Table 3 presents the results for alternative education subsamples with the first panel 
presenting the full sample results and the next two panels containing subsamples after dropping 
individuals with four-year college degrees or dropping individuals with two or more years of 
college, respectively.  The effect of employment access and poverty on labor force participation 
increases in magnitude as high human capital individuals are eliminated from the sample.  This 
pattern should be expected if the influence of employment access and poverty on labor force 
participation is driven primarily by neighborhood contributions to job networks. Similarly, the 
effect of poverty on weeks worked increases in magnitude, and the effect of poverty on hours 
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becomes negative but is still insignificant.31  On the other hand, the negative effect of 
employment access on weeks per year and hours per week worked is quite stable as college 
educated workers are dropped from the sample.  This result is not very surprising.  The models 
are estimated for people who are already in the labor market so that the influence of job access is 
likely to represent costs associated with commuting to an existing job.  Commuting costs are 
often primarily time costs, which actually rise with human capital levels.32  Table 4 presents a 
similar exercise dropping white collar workers and shows that the importance of employment 
access for labor force participation is larger for non-white collar workers. 
The negative effect of percent college educated on labor force participation falls for 
lower skill populations. This effect might be expected to increase in magnitude if this relationship 
was driven by the availability of job market referrals since non-college graduates would appear to 
be least likely to benefit from referrals provided by college graduates. The decline in the 
variable’s effect for populations with lower human capital may reflect a lower demand for these 
neighborhood amenities among low human capital individuals and therefore less substitution 
towards leisure among non-college educated.  Again, Table 4 mirrors the results for education 
with non-white collar workers experiencing a smaller negative relationship between the presence 
of college graduates in a neighborhood and labor force participation. 
Table 5 presents estimates for subsamples based on gender and family structure.  The 
table focuses on a series of subsamples that are designed to represent increased attachment to the 
labor market by first dropping married females with children from the sample, then dropping all 
married females, and finally dropping all females from the sample and focusing only on prime-
age males.  The results are quite striking.  All estimates for the four neighborhood variables 
decline in magnitude and many become statistically insignificant suggesting that women and 
especially married women are driving our findings.  As in Tables 3 and 4, this table further 
supports the idea that neighborhoods matter most for the labor market activity of individuals who 
are not strongly attached to the labor market. 
 
Decomposing the Effects of the Identification Strategy 
Table 6 presents the estimates on the neighborhood variables for a series of 
specifications.  The first column presents the results from OLS, and the second column presents 
                                                 
31 This suggests a larger positive effect of poverty on hours for the college educated. This finding may 
represent a neighborhood amenities story with high education individuals disliking spending time at home 
when they reside in high poverty rate neighborhoods and responding to this dislike by working more hours. 
32 See Ross and Zenou (2004) for a study that examines the relationship between commute time and labor 
market outcomes. 
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the results from a second stage estimation where the neighborhood fixed effects from labor 
market models are regressed upon neighborhood variables.  The third column contains estimates 
for a simple instrumental variable model where the three neighborhood variables are predicted 
using the expected exposure level based on observationally equivalent individuals.  The final 
three columns add a housing price residual from a simple housing price hedonic using ordinary 
least squares, instrument for that residual based on observationally equivalent individuals, and 
finally instrument for a unbiased residual arising from using IV in the housing price/rent model. 
The main conclusion arising from this table is that the increase in the importance of 
neighborhood variables arises from instrumenting for those variables in order to break the link 
between those neighborhood variables and the individual unobservable. The two stage fixed 
effect estimates look nothing like the results from the IV specification, and the IV specifications 
are broadly similar in terms of the effect of observed neighborhood attributes.  In addition, the 
housing price residual does not matter until an instrument is used to break the correlation between 
those neighborhood unobservables and individual unobservables.  The overall effect of 
neighborhood appears to be smaller in the final IV specification as compared the intermediate IV 
specifications suggesting that the effect of neighborhood may in some cases be overstated when 
the model does not correctly control for sorting over location specific unobservables.  
As discussed earlier, these findings are consistent with a compensation strategy where 
individuals with lower likelihoods of employment seek out neighborhoods that provide the best 
opportunity for employment.  Of course, the negative correlation between individual labor market 
unobservables and neighborhood contribution to labor market outcomes may be driven by tastes 
over neighborhood attributes.  For example, individuals with poor labor market unobservables 
may also exhibit the weakest preference for positive amenities associated with neighborhoods that 
have poor job access or attract a large number of college graduates based on their housing stock, 
and as a result these individuals reside in neighborhoods that provide better job market 
opportunities.  On the other hand, the influence of location unobservables appears to arise from 
positive selection where individuals with high taste observables reside in neighborhoods with 
positive neighborhood unobservables in terms of labor market outcomes.  
 
Exploring Neighborhood Determinants 
Table 7 presents a series of specifications starting with no neighborhood controls except 
for the housing market residual and then expanding the list of controls to add poverty, 
employment access, percent with a four-year college education, percent disadvantaged minorities, 
and finally percent not born in the United States in sequence.  A unique set of neighborhood 
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housing price residuals is constructed for each specification where the residual is conditional on 
the same set of neighborhood controls that were included in the labor market equation.  For 
example, in the no neighborhood control specification, the housing price regression contains no 
neighborhood controls, and the housing price residual captures the net impact of all aspects of 
neighborhood quality that are reflected in housing prices. 
The key finding of a large negative impact of poverty on labor force participation and 
weeks worked is quite robust across specifications.  The estimated coefficients are similar in 
magnitude whether or not the specification includes employment access and percent college 
educated and the magnitude increases with the inclusion of the share minority and immigrant 
because those neighborhood variables, especially share immigrant, appear to be associated with 
higher levels of work on all three measures.  Neighborhoods with a high share of immigrants may 
provide especially fertile ground for job referrals and other aspects of the informal job search 
process.  The positive impact of employment access on weeks worked and hours appears robust, 
but the magnitude falls off as the share minority and immigrant variables are included, and 
employment access appears to have no impact on labor force participation after including the 
minority and immigration composition variables.33  The negative relationship between percent 
college educated and labor market outcomes is very stable for all three outcome variables. 
The estimated coefficient on neighborhood quality is smaller in magnitude for all three 
labor market outcomes and negative for weeks and hours worked in the model that does not 
contain any other neighborhood variables.  In this model, the neighborhood quality variable 
captures the net effect of neighborhood given the correlation between different factors that arise 
in equilibrium, and this net affect appears to be smaller than the individual effects of 
neighborhood attributes and ambiguous in sign.  In equilibrium, the share of college graduates is 
negatively with poverty rates, and yet both variables reduce the rate and intensity of labor force 
participation.  In practice, they likely cancel out leading to little net influence of neighborhood 
quality (as captured by price) on labor market outcomes. Once the college degree variable is 
included, the sign on the housing price residual is consistently positive and the estimated 
magnitudes are quite stable. Whether the variable captures the low referral contribution of college 
graduates or consumption amenities that increase the demand for leisure, the inclusion of this 
variable separates two sets of neighborhood unobservables that are both positively correlated with 
                                                 
33 The fact that the employment access estimates may not be robust to the inclusion of additional 
neighborhood variables should not be surprising.  Remember, unlike the neighborhood demographic 
composition variables, job access is assumed exogenous to neighborhood unobservables, which will lead 
bias due to omitted minority and immigration variables if job access is correlated with omitted 
neighborhood variables that attract those populations. 
 28 
price based measures of neighborhood quality, but have conflicting impacts on labor market 
outcomes. 
 
Additional Validation and Robustness Efforts 
Table 8 presents estimates of the relationship between capital income and neighborhood 
variables in order to see whether our identification strategy implies unrealistically large impacts 
of neighborhood attributes on capital income.  Such findings would suggest that our identification 
strategy is flawed.  Capital income is very noisy and attempts to estimate linear models of capital 
income did not provide credible estimates on individual attributes.  For example, these analyses 
found no statistically significant relationship between age or education and capital income.  In 
order to mitigate the effect of noise in the self-reported capital income, we focus on three binary 
variables, which were defined as zero if the individual had between zero capital income and some 
positive threshold, one if they had capital income above that threshold, and missing if capital 
income is not reported, imputed or negative.  The three thresholds used are $0, $1,000, and 
$3,000. 
Employment access, percent college educated, and in some cases poverty are all 
correlated with capital income as indicated by the simple OLS regressions.  The estimates on 
neighborhood variables from the instrumental variable specifications are always statistically 
insignificant and almost always smaller that the estimates arising from OLS.  The one exception 
is the coefficient on poverty in the model for whether capital income is above $3,000.  Even for 
this estimate, the magnitude of the effect is quite small with a one standard deviation in poverty 
leading to a less than one percent change in likelihood of having capital income above $3,000.34 
Table 9 presents the results for three alternative indicators of labor market outcomes:  
whether worked any weeks last year, whether employed last week, and number of hours worked 
last week if employed.  These variables parallel the three dependent variables used for most of the 
analysis with worked last year capturing behaviors related to labor force participation, employed 
last week capturing the risk of unemployment that might reduce the number of week worked in 
any year, and hours last week capturing behaviors similar to those captured by average hours 
worked per week last year.  The first panel contains the results for the original three outcome 
variables and the second contains the results for these three alternative variables.  The estimated 
effects of neighborhood attributes based on the original variables and based on the alternative 
                                                 
34 A reader might question whether the increasingly positive coefficient on poverty in the IV specification 
might represent a trend and become large and significant for higher thresholds.  We examined models with 
higher capital income thresholds and did not find any such trend. 
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dependent variables are quite similar.35 
Table 10 incorporates a control for the quality of the housing stock in a neighborhood, 
which is an aggregation of the same housing stock variables used to instrument for neighborhood 
composition variables.  The original IV specification and the specification that includes this 
control for housing stock are shown side by side.  A quick comparison confirms that the 
magnitudes of all estimated coefficients are quite stable to the inclusion of a housing stock 
control into both the labor market and housing price/rent models.  The reader should note that the 
model includes the actual housing stock rather than an instrument based on the exposure of 
observationally equivalent households.  The inclusion of the housing stock control is intended to 
assure that the housing price residual is identified by unexplained variation in housing prices 
rather than a housing stock exclusion restriction, and the large and significant coefficient estimate 
on housing stock represent sorting bias rather than any direct effect of neighborhood housing 
stock on labor market outcomes.36 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we consider the general problem of identifying the effect of individual and 
group attributes on individual outcomes in a model that allows for both individual and group 
unobservables.  We begin by using a simple version of the canonical vertical model of sorting 
developed in Epple and Platt (1998) and Epple and Sieg (1999) (EPS) to highlight the complex 
set of correlations that even a simple model of residential sorting induces between all individual 
and group attributes.  We then offer a non-parametric solution to this identification problem that 
is grounded in the structure of the sorting equilibrium in the EPS model.  In particular, we exploit 
the monotonic relationship between neighborhood housing prices and neighborhood quality in 
equilibrium to show that a flexible function of neighborhood housing prices serves as a suitable 
control function for the neighborhood unobservable in the labor market outcome regression. By 
including this control function, we eliminate the group unobservable from the regression, thereby 
reducing the problem to a more standard selection problem with a single individual-level 
unobservable. 
To address this more standard selection problem, we use aggregation to develop suitable 
instruments for both exogenous and endogenous group attributes. Instrumenting for each 
                                                 
35 The participation and hours variables are directly comparable to each other in magnitude.  The estimates 
in the employment and weeks worked equations are not, but one can verify that the relative magnitudes of 
the coefficient estimates from the two models are quite close. 
36 Results are also robust to a model that instruments for housing stock, and in that model housing stock is 
not statistically significant. 
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individual’s observed neighborhood attributes with the average neighborhood attributes of a set of 
observationally identical individuals eliminates the portion of the variation in neighborhood 
attributes due to sorting on unobserved individual attributes. 
To illustrate our proposed methodology, we estimate a wide variety of labor market 
models using confidential data on the Boston Metropolitan Area from the 1990 census long form.  
We find that neighborhood has large and complex affects on labor market outcomes.  
Employment access, low levels of poverty, a low fraction of college graduates, and high levels of 
unobserved neighborhood attributes are all associated with higher levels of labor force 
participation, greater number of weeks worked in a year, and with the exception of poverty 
greater average number of hours worked per week.  The estimated effects of neighborhood 
variables are economically meaningful with for example a one standard deviation increase in 
employment access leading to approximately a four percentage point increase in labor force 
participation in the subsample of individuals who have never attended college.  Moreover, the 
estimated effects are substantially larger than estimates arising from ordinary least squares 
suggesting that individuals with a lower likelihood of obtaining employment have sorted into 
locations with superior labor market opportunities potentially to compensate for their poor 
unobservables.  It is notable that the core results in the paper are robust across many outcomes 
variables and a wide variety of specifications.   
As expected, the positive impact of low neighborhood poverty rates and good job access 
on labor force participation increases as high human capital individuals or white collar workers 
are deleted from the sample.  The existing literature suggests that these individuals are least likely 
to benefit from informal labor market referral networks.  On the other hand, the positive impact of 
good job access on the intensity of labor force participation as captured by weeks per year and 
hours per week does not change as the human capital level of the sample falls.  This finding may 
in part be due to the fact that high human capital individuals have a high cost of time and 
therefore may substitute away from work as commutes increase.  The effects over gender are 
even more striking all findings decline in magnitude and many become statistically insignificant 
as married women and eventually all women are deleted from the sample.  Overall, the results 
indicate that neighborhood effects are most important for individuals with weak attachment to the 
labor market, especially married women. 
While the effect of individual variables appears large, the net effect of neighborhood 
quality is actually quite small.  This finding appears to be driven by the strong negative effect of 
the percent of college graduates in a neighborhood on labor market outcomes.  Neighborhoods 
with low poverty rates and other attributes that positively impact labor market outcomes appear 
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correlated with the percent of college graduates in equilibrium.  These competing effects lead to  
small and sometimes negative relationships between overall neighborhood quality and various 
labor market outcomes, which is consistent with findings in the Moving to Opportunity program 
that improvements in neighborhoods quality had little or no impact on earnings.   Moreover, these 
findings help explain a puzzle in the MTO results.  Voucher recipients in MTO experience 
improved health outcomes, but do not experience the improvement in labor market outcomes 
often associated with improvements in physical and mental health.  The positive effects of 
improved health on labor market potential may have been counteracted by other influences of 
neighborhood that lead to reduced labor supply. 
These findings suggest that a richer understanding of the relationship between 
neighborhood and economic self-sufficiency is required to address the high unemployment rates 
and low incomes occurring in poor, central city neighborhoods.  High poverty rate neighborhoods 
appear to have a large negative affect on labor market outcomes, especially for low human capital 
populations.  This large effect might be attributable in part to the negative impacts of high 
poverty locations on health and emotional well being found in the Moving to Opportunity 
program.  Future mobility programs should take into account the possibility that small net effects 
of neighborhood quality hide large positive and negative impacts on labor market outcomes.  For 
example, the potential negative impact of moving on informal referral networks may in part be 
offset by increased provision of formal job search support.   
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Table 1:  Variable Names, Description, Means, and Standard Errors 
Variable Names Variable Description Means and 
Standard Error 
Respondent Outcome Variables 
Labor-Force 
Participant 
One if respondent was working or looking for work at the time of the Census Survey 0.854 
(0.352) 
Weeks-Worked 
Last-Year 
Total number of weeks worked last year; missing if no weeks worked last year 40.105 
19.228) 
Weekly-Hours 
Last-Year 
Average number of hours worked per week last year; missing if worked less than 40 weeks 
last year 
34.388 
(17.635) 
Worked-Last 
Year 
One if respondent worked any weeks last year 0.856 
(0.350) 
Employed-Last 
Week 
One if respondent was employed last week, zero if unemployed and a labor force participant, 
and missing otherwise 
0.811 
(0.390) 
Hours-Worked 
Last-Week 
Number of hours worked last week; missing if not employed last week 32.551 
19.750) 
Positive-Capital 
Income 
One if respondent has positive capital income; missing if capital income negative, imputed or 
not reported 
0.453 
(0.498) 
Capital-Income 
>1000 
One if respondent has positive capital income; missing if capital income negative, imputed or 
not reported 
0.307 
(0.461) 
Capital-Income 
>3000 
One if respondent has positive capital income; missing if capital income negative, imputed or 
not reported 
0.268 
(0.443) 
Categorical Respondent Control Variables 
Male 
 
One if respondent male (omitted category female) 0.482 
(0.499) 
Age35-44 
 
One if respondent between 35 and 44 years of age (omitted category 25 to 34 years) 0.317 
(0.465) 
Age45-59 
 
One if respondent between 45 and 59 years of age 0.302 
(0.459) 
Black 
 
One if respondent non-Hispanic Black (omitted category non-Hispanic white) 0.047 
(0.210) 
Hispanic 
 
One if respondent Hispanic 0.033 
(0.178) 
Asian 
 
One if respondent Asian or Pacific Islander 0.029 
(0.167) 
No-High-School 
 
One if respondent did not graduate from high school (omitted category high school graduate) 0.099 
(0.298) 
Some-college 
 
One if respondent finished at least two years of college but does not have four year degree 0.247 
(0.431) 
College 
 
One if respondent gradudated with a four year college degree 0.404 
(0.490) 
Single-
Independent 
One if respondent is single and not living with family members (omitted category married 
not residing with any of their own children who are under the age of 18 – minors) 
0.224 
(0.417) 
Single-parent 
 
One if respondent is a single parent residing with their minor child 0.094 
(0.291) 
Single-with-
family 
One if respondent is single and living with family members other than their children 0.051 
(0.219) 
Married-with-
17yr-kid 
One if respondent is married and residing with their minor children 0.179 
(0.383) 
Married-with-0-
5yr-kid 
One if respondent married residing with their own child under the age of six (omitted 
category married residing with their own children, but no child under the age of six) 
0.187 
(0.390) 
Married-Female 
 
Interaction between marital status and respondent female 0.321 
(0.467) 
Married-Female-
kids 
Interaction between marital status, respondent female, and residing with own minor children 0.184 
(0.387) 
Married-Female-
0-5-kids 
Interaction between marital status, respondent female, and residing with own child who is 
under the age of six 
0.093 
(0.291) 
Non-US-born 
 
One if respondent is U.S. citizen not born in the U.S. (omitted category born in the U.S.) 0.065 
(0.247) 
Non-US-Citizen 
 
One if respondent is not a U.S. citizen 0.072 
(0.259) 
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Table 1:  Variable Names, Description, Means, and Standard Errors (Continued) 
Variable Names Variable Description Means and 
Standard Error 
Neighborhood Level Variables 
Employment-
Access 
Employment access index based on gravity model using non-parametrically smoothed 
estimates of commuting time between census tracts 
1.051 
(0.067) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
Percent of households in poverty within a census block group 0.051 
(0.065) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
Percent of prime age individuals (age 25-59) with a four year college degree within a census 
block group 
0.401 
(0.210) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
Block group mean of the housing price residual arising from a metropolitan wide housing 
price hedonic that controls for the three block group attributes listed above 
0.005 
(0.067) 
Percent-Minority 
Disadvantage 
Percent of households in census block group headed by either an African-American or 
Hispanic respondent  
0.084 
(0.177) 
Percent-Not-
Born 
US 
Percent of prime age individuals in census block group who were not born in the United 
States 
0.069 
(0.061) 
Housing-Stock 
Index 
Block group mean of a housing stock index based on mean housing stock attributes of each 
block group using the coefficient estimates on those mean attributes in a housing price 
hedonic  
0.215 
(0.167) 
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Table 2:  Models of Labor Models Outcomes 
Labor Force Participant Weeks Worked Last Year Weekly Hours Last Year Variables 
OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model 
Male 
 
0.022 
(8.12) 
0.018 
(6.60) 
-0.549 
(-5.39) 
-0.573 
(-5.43) 
  2.664 
(28.21) 
  2.626 
(27.10) 
Age35-44 
 
0.001 
(0.36) 
0.009 
(3.59) 
0.721 
(8.77) 
  1.014 
(10.95) 
-0.534 
(-6.81) 
0.050 
(0.58) 
Age45-59 
 
  -0.053 
(-22.05) 
  -0.040 
(-11.77) 
0.571 
(6.51) 
1.096 
(9.06) 
  -1.569 
(-19.03) 
-0.578 
(-5.63) 
Black 
 
0.031 
(5.90) 
   0.098 
 (10.70) 
0.352 
(1.94) 
-0.018 
(-0.06) 
0.707 
(4.45) 
-1.266 
(-4.68) 
Hispanic 
 
-0.010 
(-1.43) 
0.034 
(3.74) 
-0.365 
(-1.48) 
-0.670 
(-2.12) 
0.151 
(0.65) 
-1.423 
(-4.83) 
Asian 
 
-0.041 
(-4.55) 
-0.028 
(-3.05) 
-0.042 
(-0.17) 
-0.093 
(-0.35) 
0.611 
(2.31) 
-0.074 
(-0.28) 
No-High-School 
 
  -0.087 
(-20.44) 
  -0.076 
(-16.14) 
-1.271 
(-8.52) 
-1.535 
(-9.02) 
0.010 
(0.08) 
-0.799 
(-5.85) 
Some-college 
 
  0.052 
(20.69) 
  0.054 
(17.43) 
0.580 
(6.58) 
1.023 
(9.06) 
0.411 
(5.04) 
  1.262 
(12.31) 
College 
 
  0.082 
(33.70) 
  0.097 
(14.28) 
0.672 
(7.90) 
1.989 
(8.12) 
  1.874 
(23.01 
  4.025 
(17.89) 
Single-
Independent 
  -0.035 
(-12.34) 
-0.039 
(-8.74) 
  -1.253 
(-11.43) 
-1.516 
(-9.20) 
  -1.627 
(-13.96) 
  -2.611 
(-16.49) 
Single-parent 
 
  -0.060 
(-16.56) 
  -0.049 
(-11.10) 
  -2.563 
(-17.26) 
  -2.565 
(-14.50) 
  -3.595 
(-28.23) 
  -3.751 
(-25.58) 
Single-with-
family 
  -0.148 
(-25.83) 
  -0.126 
(-20.97) 
  -3.443 
(-17.66) 
  -3.446 
(-16.63) 
  -4.082 
(-22.54) 
  -4.517 
(-23.50) 
Married-with-
17yr-kid 
0.015 
(6.34) 
0.023 
(8.09) 
0.581 
(6.14) 
0.788 
(7.49) 
1.068 
(9.70) 
  1.564 
(13.18) 
Married-with-0-
5yr-kid 
-0.003 
(-1.15) 
0.006 
(2.36) 
0.771 
(7.89)  
0.945 
(8.89) 
1.072 
(9.57) 
  1.465 
(12.17) 
Married-Female 
 
  -0.117 
(-27.77) 
  -0.118 
(-27.69) 
  -2.650 
(-17.99) 
  -2.543 
(-17.01 
  -4.506 
(-30.99) 
  -4.363 
(-29.47) 
Married-Female-
kids 
  -0.059 
(-12.20) 
  -0.059 
(-12.10) 
  -3.565 
(-20.65) 
  -3.518 
(-20.34) 
  -6.551 
(-36.33) 
-6.485 
(-3.00) 
Married-Female-
0-5-kids 
  -0.162 
(-29.24) 
  -0.162 
(-29.11) 
  -3.108 
(-14.49) 
  -3.167 
(-14.72) 
  -2.604 
(-12.25) 
  -2.696 
(-12.68) 
Non-US-born 
 
0.017 
(4.12) 
0.013 
(2.90) 
0.513 
(3.63) 
  0.40 
(2.53) 
0.971 
(6.83) 
0.583 
(3.77) 
Non-US-Citizen 
 
-0.020 
(-3.91) 
-0.034 
(-6.00) 
  -1.857 
(-10.66) 
  -2.082 
(-10.15) 
0.309 
(1.95) 
-0.472 
(-2.59) 
Employment-
Access 
0.006 
(0.32) 
0.308 
(2.02) 
1.769 
(2.83) 
19.156 
(3.41) 
-1.501 
(-2.68) 
36.068 
(7.42) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
  -0.528 
(-20.62) 
-1.055 
(-8.29) 
-11.176 
(-15.03) 
-14.709 
(-3.18) 
-3.550 
(-5.14) 
6.027 
(1.52) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
  -0.099 
(-15.01 
-0.434 
(-9.71) 
  -2.397 
(-12.26) 
-13.929 
(-8.62) 
1.264 
(6.11) 
-17.186 
(-11.93) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.514 
(9.48) 
 7.270 
(3.76) 
 11.685 
(7.33) 
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Table 3:  Labor Market Models for Subsample with Lower Education Levels 
Labor Force Participant Weeks Worked Last Year Weekly Hours Last Year  
OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model 
Full Sample 
Employment-
Access 
0.006 
(0.32) 
0.308 
(2.02) 
1.769 
(2.83) 
19.156 
(3.41) 
-1.501 
(-2.68) 
36.068 
(7.42) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
  -0.528 
(-20.62) 
-1.055 
(-8.29) 
-11.176 
(-15.03) 
-14.709 
(-3.18) 
-3.550 
(-5.14) 
6.027 
(1.52) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
  -0.099 
(-15.01 
-0.434 
(-9.71) 
  -2.397 
(-12.26) 
-13.929 
(-8.62) 
1.264 
(6.11) 
-17.186 
(-11.93) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.514 
(9.48) 
 7.270 
(3.76) 
 11.685 
(7.33) 
Sample After Dropping All Respondents with Degrees from Four Year Colleges 
Employment-
Access 
-0.004 
(-0.19) 
0.424 
(2.08) 
2.616 
(3.82) 
17.239 
(2.37) 
-3.901 
(-6.00) 
44.459 
(7.42) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
  -0.578 
(-19.75) 
-1.203 
(-7.66) 
-10.010 
(-11.52) 
-11.284 
(-2.01 
-3.020 
(-4.01 
-0.160 
(-0.03) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
  -0.092 
(-10.37) 
-0.225 
(-2.94) 
-1.671 
(-6.26) 
-14.480 
(-5.39) 
-0.403 
(-1.56) 
-16.394 
(-7.39) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.522 
(7.78) 
 11.163 
(4.58) 
 11.468 
(5.90) 
Sample After Dropping All Respondents with Two or More Years of College 
Employment-
Access 
-0.044 
(-1.59) 
0.704 
(2.28) 
3.457 
(3.82) 
14.367 
(1.30) 
  -4.701 
(-5.95) 
32.041 
(3.59) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
  -0.604 
(-17.59) 
-1.533 
(-7.00) 
-9.034 
(-7.97) 
-20.073 
(-2.53) 
-2.104 
(-2.41) 
-7.825 
(-1.19) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
-0.063 
(-4.96) 
-0.188 
(-1.38) 
-0.635 
(-1.65) 
-16.547 
(-3.47) 
0.156 
(0.44) 
-8.290 
(-2.10) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.480 
(5.57) 
 12.046 
(3.74) 
 7.121 
(2.88) 
 
 
Table 4:  Labor Market Models for Non-White Collar Subsample 
Labor Force Participant Weeks Worked Last Year Weekly Hours Last Year  
OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model 
Full Sample 
Employment-
Access 
0.006 
(0.32) 
0.308 
(2.02) 
1.769 
(2.83) 
19.156 
(3.41) 
-1.501 
(-2.68) 
36.068 
(7.42) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
  -0.528 
(-20.62) 
-1.055 
(-8.29) 
-11.176 
(-15.03) 
-14.709 
(-3.18) 
-3.550 
(-5.14) 
6.027 
(1.52) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
  -0.099 
(-15.01 
-0.434 
(-9.71) 
  -2.397 
(-12.26) 
-13.929 
(-8.62) 
1.264 
(6.11) 
-17.186 
(-11.93) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.514 
(9.48) 
 7.270 
(3.76) 
 11.685 
(7.33) 
Sample After Dropping All White Collar Employees 
Employment-
Access 
0.033 
(2.01 
0.599 
(3.92) 
1.833 
(2.59) 
19.695 
(2.85) 
-3.140 
(-4.76) 
40.048 
(7.05) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
-0.304 
(-14.16) 
-0.715 
(-5.71) 
-11.077 
(-12.42) 
-11.635 
(-2.07) 
-3.592 
(-4.58) 
4.826 
(1.05) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
-0.061 
(-9.22) 
-0.225 
(-4.41) 
-2.349 
(-9.04) 
-13.342 
(-6.12) 
-0.108 
(-0.43) 
-15.812 
(-8.57) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.288 
(5.56) 
 10.563 
(4.56) 
 10.586 
(5.79) 
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Table 5:  Labor Market Models with Gender and Family Structure Subamples 
Labor Force Participant Weeks Worked Last Year Weekly Hours Last Year  
OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model 
Full Sample 
Employment-
Access 
0.006 
(0.32) 
0.308 
(2.02) 
1.769 
(2.83) 
19.156 
(3.41) 
-1.501 
(-2.68) 
36.068 
(7.42) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
  -0.528 
(-20.62) 
-1.055 
(-8.29) 
-11.176 
(-15.03) 
-14.709 
(-3.18) 
-3.550 
(-5.14) 
6.027 
(1.52) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
  -0.099 
(-15.01 
-0.434 
(-9.71) 
  -2.397 
(-12.26) 
-13.929 
(-8.62) 
1.264 
(6.11) 
-17.186 
(-11.93) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.514 
(9.48) 
 7.270 
(3.76) 
 11.685 
(7.33) 
Sample After Dropping All Married Women with Children 
Employment-
Access 
-0.023 
(-1.23) 
0.300 
(1.88) 
0.560 
(0.83) 
10.518 
(1.82) 
-2.464 
(-4.36) 
14.477 
(2.82) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
-0.548 
(-21.49) 
-1.283 
(-9.60) 
-11.728 
(-14.178) 
-19.112 
(-3.97) 
-4.700 
(-6.48) 
3.751 
(0.89) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
-0.075 
(-11.61) 
-0.582 
(-12.45) 
-2.180 
(-10.72) 
-14.357 
(-8.49) 
1.747 
(8.29) 
-13.214 
(-8.66) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.468 
(8.39) 
 4.176 
(2.12) 
 4.029 
(2.43) 
Sample After Dropping All Married Women 
Employment-
Access 
-0.029 
(-0.38) 
0.180 
(1.09) 
0.155 
(0.21) 
0.363 
(0.06) 
-3.068 
(-5.00) 
-4.176 
(-0.78) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
-0.577 
(-21.93) 
-1.349 
(9.64) 
-12.153 
(-14.90) 
-10.489 
(-2.07) 
-5.263 
(-6.72) 
17.288 
(3.94) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
-0.049 
(-7.65) 
-0.273 
(5.63) 
-1.853 
(-8.80) 
-5.916 
(-3.28) 
2.287 
(9.95) 
1.394 
(0.84) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.473 
(7.98) 
 4.699 
(2.27) 
 4.680 
(2.71) 
Sample After Dropping All Women 
Employment-
Access 
-0.053 
(-2.83) 
-0.218 
(-1.26) 
-0.812 
(-1.12) 
-4.658 
(-0.68) 
-4.036 
(-5.82) 
-11.178 
(-1.68) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
-0.429 
(-14.21) 
-0.290 
(-2.01 
-12.042 
(-12.45) 
-5.867 
(-1.01 
-4.966 
(-4.84) 
20.916 
(3.94) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
-0.037 
(-5.17) 
-0.017 
(-0.33) 
-1.257 
(-5.35) 
-7.434 
(-3.57) 
3.131 
(11.43) 
2.438 
(1.20) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.073 
(1.01 
 2.534 
(0.94) 
 -0.779 
(-0.33) 
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Table 6:  Incremental Modification of Specification 
Models OLS Fixed Effects 
Second Stage  
IV 
Neighborhood 
Controls 
IV with 
Housing Price 
Residual  
IV for Housing 
Price Residual  
Final IV Model 
Labor Force Participant 
Employment-
Access 
0.006 
(0.32) 
0.027 
(1.28) 
0.620 
(4.18) 
  0.601 
(4.05) 
1.461 
(8.93) 
0.308 
(2.02) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
  -0.528 
(-20.62) 
-0.523 
(-30.66) 
  -1.674 
(-13.65) 
  -1.665 
(-13.52) 
  -2.250 
(-16.82) 
-1.055 
(-8.29) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
  -0.099 
(-15.01 
-0.091 
(-14.02) 
-0.251 
(-6.30) 
-0.221 
(-5.57) 
  -0.866 
(-12.36) 
-0.434 
(-9.71) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
   -0.062 
(-9.07) 
  0.696 
(11.68) 
0.514 
(9.48) 
Weeks Worked Last Year 
Employment-
Access 
-1.501 
(-2.68) 
1.011 
(0.84) 
43.157 
(9.01 
43.568 
(9.10) 
52.121 
(9.72) 
36.068 
(7.42) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
-3.550 
(-5.14) 
-42.043 
(-43.32) 
-6.902 
(-1.99) 
-7.159 
(-2.06) 
-13.454 
(-3.53) 
6.027 
(1.52) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
1.264 
(6.11) 
1.251 
(3.40) 
-12.892 
(-9.60) 
-13.490 
(-10.08) 
-19.426 
(-9.02) 
-17.186 
(-11.93) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
   1.301 
(7.03) 
7.243 
(3.86) 
11.685 
(7.33) 
Weekly Hours Last Year 
Employment-
Access 
1.769 
(2.83) 
-1.925 
(-1.84) 
23.570 
(4.29) 
23.066 
(4.20) 
31.185 
(5.10) 
19.156 
(3.41) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
-11.176 
(-15.03) 
-32.24 
(-37.98) 
-22.723 
(-5.36) 
-22.413 
(-5.28) 
-28.302 
(-5.90) 
-14.709 
(-3.18) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
  -2.397 
(-12.26) 
4.073 
(12.64) 
-11.251 
(-7.83) 
-10.521 
(-7.31) 
-16.80 
(-6.69) 
-13.929 
(-8.62) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
   -1.601 
(-8.70) 
6.147 
(2.87) 
7.270 
(3.76) 
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Table 7:  Final IV Model for Alternative Sets of Neighborhood Controls 
Models No 
Neighborhood 
Controls 
Poverty Only Poverty and 
Employment 
Access 
Plus Percent 
College 
Graduate  
Plus Percent 
Minority 
Disadvantaged  
Plus Percent 
not born in 
U.S. 
Labor Force Participant 
Employment-
Access 
  -0.166 
(-1.11) 
0.308 
(2.02) 
0.226 
(1.47) 
-0.039 
(-0.24) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
   -1.226 
(-11.81) 
-0.905 
(-7.11) 
-1.055 
(-8.29) 
-1.435 
(-9.27) 
  -1.772 
(-11.19) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
   -0.434 
(-9.71) 
-0.435 
(-9.68) 
-0.361 
(-8.12) 
Percent-
Minority 
Disadvantage 
    0.186 
(4.43) 
0.053 
(1.22) 
Percent-Not-
Born 
US 
     1.268 
(7.49) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
0.308 
(9.90) 
0.106 
(3.45) 
0.259 
(6.24) 
0.514 
(9.48) 
  0.586 
(10.59) 
0.526 
(9.27) 
Weeks Worked Last Year 
Employment-
Access 
  3.779 
(0.71) 
19.156 
(3.41) 
17.570 
(3.11) 
12.808 
(2.20) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
 -11.556 
(-3.31) 
-9.154 
(-2.00) 
-14.709 
(-3.18) 
-23.654 
(-4.31) 
-28.957 
(-5.21) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
   -13.929 
(-8.62) 
-13.863 
(-8.58) 
-12.735 
(-7.85) 
Percent-
Minority 
Disadvantage 
      4.20 
(3.01 
1.892 
(1.28) 
Percent-Not-
Born 
US 
     21.906 
(4.24) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
-1.577 
(-1.60) 
-3.217 
(-3.11) 
0.303 
(0.21) 
7.270 
(3.76) 
8.628 
(4.38) 
7.794 
(3.88) 
Weekly Hours Last Year 
Employment-
Access 
  20.378 
(4.47) 
36.068 
(7.42) 
34.843 
(7.14) 
28.495 
(5.64) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
 13.136 
(4.39) 
8.823 
(2.25) 
6.027 
(1.52) 
-0.474 
(-0.10) 
-7.005 
(-1.43) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
   -17.186 
(-11.93) 
-17.202 
(-11.88) 
-15.898 
(-10.97) 
Percent-
Minority 
Disadvantage 
    2.995 
(2.35) 
0.094 
(0.07) 
Percent-Not-
Born 
US 
     28.035 
(5.89) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
-3.830 
(-4.19) 
-1.890 
(-1.86) 
0.454 
(0.36) 
11.685 
(7.33) 
12.837 
(7.84) 
12.136 
(7.16) 
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Table 8:  Relationship between Neighborhood and Capital Income 
Positive Capital Income Capital Income Above $1,000 Capital Income Above $3,000 Variables 
OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model 
Employment-
Access 
0.143 
(3.82) 
0.079 
(0.41) 
0.159 
(4.70) 
0.034 
(0.19) 
0.158 
(5.19) 
0.045 
(0.26) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
-0.127 
(-3.33) 
-0.058 
(-0.38) 
-0.042 
(-1.22) 
0.065 
(0.46) 
0.012 
(0.38) 
0.152 
(1.10) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
0.084 
(6.40) 
0.051 
(0.88) 
0.043 
(3.63) 
.0002 
(0.01 
0.026 
(2.40) 
-0.034 
(0.64) 
Housing-Market 
Residual 
 -0.004 
(-0.06) 
 0.038 
(0.64) 
 0.058 
(1.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 9:  Core and Supplemental Models of Labor Models Outcomes 
Core Labor Market Outcomes 
Labor Force Participant Weeks Worked Last Year Average Hours per Week Last 
Year 
 
OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model 
Employment-
Access 
0.006 
(0.32) 
0.308 
(2.02) 
1.769 
(2.83) 
19.156 
(3.41) 
-1.501 
(-2.68) 
36.068 
(7.42) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
  -0.528 
(-20.62) 
-1.055 
(-8.29) 
-11.176 
(-15.03) 
-14.709 
(-3.18) 
-3.550 
(-5.14) 
6.027 
(1.52) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
  -0.099 
(-15.01 
-0.434 
(-9.71) 
  -2.397 
(-12.26) 
-13.929 
(-8.62) 
1.264 
(6.11) 
-17.186 
(-11.93) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
 0.514 
(9.48) 
 7.270 
(3.76) 
 11.685 
(7.33) 
Supplemental Labor Market Outcomes 
Worked Last Year Employment Last Week Hours Worked Last Week  
OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model OLS Final IV Model 
Employment-
Access 
-0.004 
(-0.25) 
0.647 
(3.98) 
0.013 
(1.17) 
0.362 
(3.10) 
-1.324 
(-2.20) 
44.266 
(8.34) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
  -0.661 
(-24.91) 
-1.308 
(-9.46) 
-0.146 
(-9.14) 
-0.337 
(-3.32) 
-4.498 
(-5.86) 
1.906 
(0.42) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
  -0.067 
(-10.45) 
  -0.603 
(-12.59) 
0.009 
(2.63) 
-0.258 
(-7.96) 
0.646 
(2.89) 
-19.296 
(-12.25) 
Housing-Price 
Residual 
   0.704 
(11.70) 
 0.201 
(4.92) 
 12.920 
(7.27) 
 
 
Table 10:  Incorporation of Neighborhood Housing Stock Controls 
Labor Force Participant Weeks Worked Last Year Average Hours per Week Last Year Variables 
Final IV Model Control for 
Housing Stock  
Final IV Model Control for 
Housing Stock  
Final IV Model Control for 
Housing Stock  
Employment-
Access 
0.308 
(2.02) 
0.591 
(3.84) 
19.156 
(3.41) 
20.941 
(3.68) 
36.068 
(7.42) 
38.235 
(7.70) 
Percent-Poverty 
 
-1.055 
(-8.29) 
-1.079 
(-8.60) 
-14.709 
(-3.18) 
-14.580 
(-3.18) 
6.027 
(1.52) 
5.862 
(1.49) 
Percent-College 
Graduate 
-0.434 
(-9.71) 
  -0.633 
(-12.36) 
-13.929 
(-8.62) 
-15.650 
(-8.97) 
-17.186 
(-11.93) 
-19.122 
(-11.92) 
Housing-Stock 
Index 
 0.622 
(10.21) 
 4.350 
(2.25) 
 5.021 
(2.58) 
Housing-Market 
Residual 
0.514 
(9.48) 
  0.595 
(11.43) 
7.270 
(3.76) 
8.277 
(4.48) 
 11.685 
(7.33)  
12.564 
(8.14) 
 
 
 
 
